**TITLE**

Some Results and Open Problems in Applications of Cooperative Games

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**ABSTRACT**

As it is well known, the theory of cooperative games finds applications in many fields. The goal of this paper is to highlight some applications of cooperative games, resulting from the cooperation between the Universities of Bergamo and Krakow, and some related open problems. The paper is organized in three main sections. The first deals with the description of some specific fields where the theory of cooperative games has been applied (i.e. interfering elements, international economics and marketing cooperatives). The second section discusses general results about power indices. The third section presents several applications to Finance and Politics. We discuss these models and the related open problems in a simple and informal way to facilitate understanding by scholars from fields other than game theory.

**KEYWORDS**

cooperative games, power indices, finance, politics, interfering elements, international economics, marketing cooperatives

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**Cite this paper**

Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, Izabella Stach, Maurizio Zola. (2017) Some Results and Open Problems in Applications of Cooperative Games. *International Journal of Economics and Management Systems, ***2**, 271-276

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